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 Abstract 
Little is known about cooperation between nations engaged in a regional economic 
association. This study investigates cooperation and closure between Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies engaged in negotiating five 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTA), including the Australia–Singapore FTA 2003, 
United States–Singapore FTA 2003, Chile–United States FTA 2003, Australia–United 
States FTA 2004, and Korea–Australia FTA 2014. This study found that a number of 
factors bring about or interfere with cooperation at the closure stage. Negotiation 
closure occurs within FTAs when discussions shift from trade diplomats focused on 
technical matters to senior national leaders focused on political decisions. 
Creditable deadline, party stability and instability, and linkage dynamics were also 
found to support or interfere with cooperation at the closure stage in FTA 
negotiations. Often FTA negotiations are concluded on the sidelines of meetings 
sponsored by international organizations including APEC Leaders’ Summit and 
Ministerial meetings.  
Keywords  
Cooperation and closure, bilateral negotiation, free trade agreements (FTA), Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC)  
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Cooperation and Closure in Bilateral Trade 
Negotiations * 
 
Larry Crump 
Cooperation and the pre-negotiation stage have received some scholarly 
attention, while only a few studies specifically focus on cooperation and the 
concluding negotiation stage. This scholarly omission is curious, as one purpose of 
negotiation analysis is to identify how to manage risk and opportunity through 
strategic action. We require greater understanding of the dynamics that support 
the initiation and concluding negotiation stages, as these stages are where 
opportunity may be gained or lost (Crump 2011). This paper begins by briefly 
reviewing what we know about the initiating or pre-negotiation stage followed by 
an exploration of cooperation within the concluding stage, or negotiation 
‘endgame’.  
Janis Gross Stein (1988) links these two stages together by observing that the 
capacity to explain the final outcome of a negotiation may only be achieved 
through a clear understanding of the pre-negotiation or initiation stage, as this is 
when problems are framed and defined, goals are shaped and reshaped, and 
preferences formulated.  
Parties and issues are often included and excluded prior to and during the 
commencing negotiation stage (Sebenius 1983), issues are analyzed and framed 
(Putnam and Holmer 1992), linkages between past and present negotiations are 
examined (Crump 2007, 2010), and a negotiation agenda is adopted and the order 
of agenda items established (Albin and Young 2012; Pendergast 1990). The location 
and frequency of meetings, the selection of specific negotiators and related 
matters are also established during pre-negotiation (Gross Stein 1989; Saunders 
1985; Zartman 1989). Such decisions present each party with opportunities that can 
be gained or lost depending on how decisions are managed during the initiation 
stage of a negotiation. 
This brief review of the pre-negotiation stage provides a context for examining 
the concluding negotiation stage, or endgame – a stage that requires parties to 
shift their preferences into priorities and convert negotiation interests and goals 
into acceptable and unacceptable outcomes. The slight amount of research that 
focuses specifically on the negotiation endgame exists in a multilateral 
environment and examines coalition behaviour, negotiation complexity, decision-
making, leadership, and negotiation deadlines. 
                                                          
 * A first draft of this paper was prepared for an UNDP-funded workshop organized by the 
Montenegro Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with Johns Hopkins University in 2015.  
Revisions to this paper were undertaken while a Senior Fellow at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / 
Centre for Global Cooperation Research. The author gratefully acknowledges the support and 
funding received through the Centre. 
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1 Negotiation Endgame: Review of Literature 
Coalitions may be understood through a three-part sequential framework: 
coalition building, coalition behaviour and coalition maintenance. Endgame activity 
is identified within the coalition behaviour portion of this framework, which is 
concerned with strategizing and transactions, balancing power, and the use of 
resources and roles – including leadership (Dupont 1996).  
Coalitions often serve to reduce complexity, while complexity is often identified 
as a challenge to be managed within multilateral negotiations (Zartman 1994; 
Crump and Zartman 2003). Within the endgame, however, complexity is not only 
identified as a challenge; it is also considered to be an opportunity. Complexity can 
help break through the last outstanding issues once a long negotiation moves 
towards closure, as a complicated and vague situation provides negotiators with 
flexibility regarding how the outcome is portrayed to constituents (Winham 1987).  
Final choices in multilateral negotiations are political. Decision-making at the 
endgame is more a matter of educated political guesswork than a precise 
calculation of advantage. Many outstanding issues must be woven together into a 
package deal that provides a basic quid-pro-quo for the negotiating parties. The 
final stage is concerned with achieving a settlement that is defensible for all 
parties, and technical notions of a balance – which may have been a primary 
concern in earlier stages – are less relevant during the endgame (Winham 1987). 
Often negotiation delegations experience a transition during the endgame as 
senior leaders take over, while lower-level technical delegation members – who put 
much of the deal together – play an advisory role to these senior officials. From 
several dimensions, leadership emerges as a critical issue during the endgame. 
Delegation leadership requires that a negotiation team be organized in a 
decentralized manner to effectively study technical issues, and in a centralized and 
hierarchical manner to take difficult political decisions. This bi-structural 
requirement presents organizational challenges for party leadership (Winham 
1987). 
The endgame within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay 
Round (1986–94) has been careful examined (Stewart 1999). Publication of the 
‘Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations’ – also known as the Dunkel Draft (named after its author, GATT 
Director-General Arthur Dunkel) established the foundation for closure in 
December 1991, but the actual endgame began in July 1993 with the appointment 
of Peter Sutherland as GATT Director-General. He arrived with a singular and 
repeated message that the last opportunity to conclude the GATT Uruguay Round 
would end on 15 December 1993 – when US Fast-Track Authority essentially 
expired (McDonough 1999).1 This deadline plus the outline of a realistic agreement 
                                                          
 1 The US Congress renewed fast-track authority (an up-or-down vote on a trade treaty in the US 
Congress with no amendments) but only for trade agreements entered into prior to 16 April 
1994, which effectively required the US President to notify Congress by 15 December 1993 of 
an intention to enter into a trade agreement (McDonough 1999). This December 1993 
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through the Dunkel Draft drove GATT parties toward a mid-December 1993 
agreement although not all economic sectors achieve closure by the deadline.  
The politically sensitive areas contained in the General Agreement for Trade in 
Services (GATS); including financial services, telecommunications, maritime 
services, audio-visual services and movement of natural persons continued to be 
negotiated after the deadline although Sutherland had firmly established the 
finality of the 15 December 1993 deadline. Nevertheless, GATS closure was elusive. 
Services negotiations continued beyond the initial deadline, with closure finally 
achieved just before the GATT Marrakesh Agreement was signed on 15 April 1994 
(Reyna 1999).   
If a deadline is to be effective it must be perceived as creditable. Sutherland had 
achieved such creditability by establishing a final date when opportunity would be 
lost if agreement were not reached. Such creditability was grounded in an 
argument that contained inherent logic (please see footnote 1). The many GATT 
negotiators that made-up the GATT Uruguay round responded to this creditable 
deadline by achieving closure. It is possible these negotiations would have 
continued to drift – with no agreement in sight – if the majority of negotiators had 
not responded positively by achieving closure by the deadline. However, once this 
outcome was achieved, Southerland was not so dogmatic as to refuse GATS gains 
that were achieved through a second GATT Uruguay deadline, which gained 
creditability though the finality associated with the signing of 15 April 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement.  
Knowledge of a second deadline prior to the initial deadline would have certainly 
weaken the creditability of the original deadline. It is possible that the existence of 
a second deadline was unknown and only evolved after the first deadline was 
achieved. Nevertheless, creditability of an original deadline followed by the 
emergence of a second deadline are interesting dynamics that deserve further 
examination if we are to understand the role of deadlines in negotiation closure.  
The present study will utilize the multilateral understanding gained through this 
literature review to examine data from a bilateral environment. The study asks: 
How do negotiations end – when is enough? As a full agreement is unlikely, when 
and how do parties know when closure is approaching? What dynamics bring about 
or interfere with closure? Why does agreement emerge at a particular moment in 
time (which, when, why and how)? Under what conditions do negotiators chose one 
ending over another (Zartman 2015)? The literature review partially answers these 
questions.  
Specifically, this study will focus on those negotiations that reach an agreement 
(when not enough is still enough). The focus of attention is on the negotiation of 
trade treaty agreements in a domain that has received little scholarly attention 
within the negotiation literature: regional economic associations (Crump 2013). 
Bilateral trade negotiations conducted by members of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum will serve as data for this investigation.  
                                                                                                                                                              
expiration date became the GATT Uruguay deadline that Peter Sutherland effectively 
promoted.  
 
Crump  |  Cooperation and Closure in Bilateral Trade Negotiations 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 17 8 
 
 
This paper begins by describing the setting and the research methodology, 
followed by a brief case synopsis of five bilateral negotiations conducted over the 
past ten years. The focus of the case presentation is to establish the dynamics that 
lead to negotiation closure.  
We examine the unique features of each case to gain further understanding 
about the specific dynamics that lead to closure. This study intends to develop a 
theoretical framework through such analysis. The paper concludes by describing a 
process model for closure in complex bilateral negotiations. This study also offers 
direction for future research so that we might further understand the forces that 
contribute to gaining or losing opportunity in the concluding stage of a 
negotiation.  
2 Research Setting 
This study draws on data from bilateral negotiations conducted between 
members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Former Australian 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke first proposed the idea of APEC during a speech in 
January 1989. Ten months later, 12 Asia-Pacific countries met in Canberra to 
establish APEC – a non-treaty organization. Nine additional nations acceded to 
APEC between 1991 and 1998 to establish a 21-member economic association 
focused on security, stability and prosperity through free and open trade and 
investment (APEC History 2015). This association seeks to achieve these goals by 
information-sharing, open communication, technical support and facilitation 
between members. This association has achieved success and maturity over the 25 
years during which it has engaged its members. 
Separate and distinct from this regional association are bilateral relationships 
between APEC members – relationships that are sustained in part through 
association membership. The present study seeks to understand these bilateral 
relationships through trade negotiations conducted between APEC members, as 
one way to monitor APEC economic integration and the dynamic interaction 
created within a regional economic association. 
Not everything that happens within an economic association is multilateral, as it 
is important to recognize that regional institutions also foster bilateral 
engagement. The present study uses a bilateral and a bilateral-multiparty lens to 
understand multilateral or regional dynamics (Crump 2006, 2015), while 
concurrently seeking to understand the which, when, why and how of negotiation 
closure. Under what conditions do negotiators chose one type of ending over 
another?  
Each of these 21 APEC members has established multiple and diverse bilateral 
relationships, although the present study is only concerned with negotiations that 
produced free trade agreements (FTAs) in force between APEC members.2 APEC 
                                                          
 2 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is the most common term to describe these negotiations, but 
other terms include: Closer Economic Relations, Economic Partnership Agreements, Economic 
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reports, for example, that its 21 members have 144 enforced FTAs – but that 
includes all bilateral and regional agreements that have at least one APEC member 
as a partner, while non-APEC economies are also included in these 144 FTAs (Do 
FTAs Matter for Trade 2015).  
The present study is concerned with trade treaties that include APEC economies 
only (with no non-members present). Data gathered from 21 APEC member 
websites (e.g. Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) identified 48 
bilateral FTAs between APEC members as of May 2015.3 Crosschecking between 
member websites confirmed that these 48 bilateral FTA are currently in force 
(through crosschecking, we establish that each APEC bilateral partnership was 
identified by both partners on the national website devoted to FTAs).  
In three cases, trilateral relationships are included: economic relations between 
Canada, Mexico and the United States (via NAFTA) and economic relations between 
Hong Kong, China and Chile, and Hong Kong China and New Zealand. Trilateral 
relationships are included in our data set when they only include APEC members.  
Table 1 (see next page) lists all 21 APEC member economies and the bilateral 
FTAs that are currently in force between APEC members (on the horizontal axis and 
on the vertical axis in alphabetical order). Identification of each treaty occurs from 
top to bottom, as we move from left to right. For example, we begin by identifying 
all of Australia’s bilateral treaties on the vertical axis, followed by Brunei’s treaties 
on the vertical axis, followed by Canada’s treaties on the vertical axis. 
A network image of this data is presented as Figure 1.4 Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and Russia (RUS) report that they do not have formal bilateral economic 
relationships with any APEC member, while the complicated political circumstances 
of Chinese Taipei (TWN) preclude formal bilateral economic relations with other 
APEC member economies.5 Three other APEC members – Brunei (BRN), Indonesia 
(IDN) and the Philippines (PHI) – each have a formal bilateral relationship with only 
one other APEC member: Japan (JPN), while Vietnam (VN) has separate FTA 
relations with Japan and Chile. However, these Southeast Asian countries have 
multiple economic relationships through membership in ASEAN.  
The 14 remaining APEC members are actively engaged in establishing FTAs with 
other APEC members economies, including Australia with eight FTAs, Canada with 
five FTAs, Chile with 11 FTAs, China with five FTAs, Hong Kong China with three 
FTAs, Japan with 11 FTAs, (South) Korea with six FTAs, Malaysia with four FTAs, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cooperation Partnership Agreements, Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement, and 
related terms. 
 3 The APEC Website identifies Free Trade Agreements and Regional Trade Agreements of APEC 
members at: http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/Other-Groups/FTA_RTA. This site lists the 
Website Link for all APEC members’ free trade agreements. Generally, these Website Links 
are directed toward the member government’s ministry or department of foreign affairs and 
trade. APEC members make a distinction between their bilateral and regional trade 
agreements (e.g. ASEAN) although the APEC Policy Support Unit does not make this same 
distinction (see Do FTAs Matter for Trade? 2015). 
 4 ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 and Alpha-3 country codes are adopted in Figure 1. 
 5 Note that APEC members are never referred to as nations or countries but as member 
economies, as one way to include both China and Chinese Taipei (commonly known as Taiwan) 
at the same international table.  
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ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 or Alpha-3 country codes are adopted in Figure One: Australia 
(AUS); Brunei (BRN); Canada (CAN); Chile (CHL); China (CHN); Hong Kong China 
(HKG); Indonesia (IDN); Japan (JPN); Korea (KOR); Malaysia (MYS); Mexico (MEX); 
New Zealand (NZ); Papua New Guinea (PNG); Peru (PER); Philippines (PHI); Russia 
(RUS); Singapore (SGP); Chinese Taipei (TWN); Thailand (THA); United States (USA); 
and Viet Nam (VN). 
This study investigates five of these 48 bilateral FTA negotiations, or around 10 
per cent. These five negotiations were selected as a convenience sample to 
examine negotiation processes and outcomes between APEC member economies 
with a focus on understand how closure is achieved in FTA negotiations. Figure 1 
identifies the FTA cases under investigation within this study via dashed lines, while 
straight continuous lines represent all other FTAs.  
The following five bilateral FTA negotiations were investigated in this study to 
construct five case studies:  
 Singapore–Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (SAFTA) 
 United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (USSFTA) 
 Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement of 2004 (AUSFTA) 
 Chile–United States Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (CUSFTA) 
 Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2014 (KAFTA) 
With five cases under investigation, we will utilize comparative case analysis to 
identify similarities and differences to support the development of a framework to 
understand how closure is achieved in bilateral free trade agreement negotiations.  
In addition, William Zartman (2015) established a multidimensional typology for 
understanding closure. Zartman begins by identifying two closure situations: Type I 
where agreement was reached, as not enough was still enough, and Type II where 
negotiations do not reach agreement because enough was not enough. Zartman 
establishes a number of contextual factors that contribute to closure including a 
‘game of echoes’ or a sensing of how the outcome will be perceived back home in 
the face of skeptics, the opposition and outright spoilers, and a ‘game of deadlines’ 
or a recognition that every negotiation has a point at which closure might be 
expected although formal or informal, vague or precise, felt or explicit, fixed or 
postponable and externally or internally established.  
Zartman (2015) also identifies five different patterns of behaviour to arrive at 
negotiation closure: dueling, driving, dragging, mixed and mismatched. In dueling 
the parties face each other down to the wire until one ‘blinks’, which is grounded in 
a pattern of reciprocal behaviour. In driving the parties push and pull each other 
gradually to a convergence point, matching concessions and compensation, as the 
parties work on each other down to an agreement. This too is a pattern of 
reciprocal behaviour. A third pattern involves the same two patterns but 
unilaterally and non-reciprocally mismatching occurs in that one party behaves as a 
duller and the other as a driver. A fourth pattern involves dragging, in which one or 
more parties realize that they do not like the direction of the negotiation and then 
work instead to end the negotiations without significant damage. A fifth pattern is 
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a residual or mixed category in that no pattern is completely pure and consistent 
and so this category takes this possibility into consideration (Zartman 2015).  
When applying this typology to the present study we observe that all five cases 
under review are Type 1: Agreement was reached, as not enough was still enough. 
In addition, at the concluding stage, three of the cases demonstrate a pattern of 
behaviour that is purely driving (SAFTA, USSFTA and AUSFTA), a fourth case 
demonstrates a pattern of behaviour that is both driving and dueling (CUSFTA), and 
a fifth case is mixed primarily dueling up to the concluding stage before reverting 
to a driving pattern of behaviour (KAFTA). We will utilize Zartman’s typology in 
reviewing our five cases.  
3 Methodology 
This study employed qualitative research methodology in investigating these five 
FTA cases by conducting field interviews complemented by the collection of 
documents to construct case studies (see Odell 2001; Yin 1989) including a focused 
comparison approach to data analysis (Druckman 2002; Zartman 2005).  
Three periods of field interviews with trade negotiators, trade policy specialists, 
diplomats and ambassadors were conducted to construct these five cases. SAFTA, 
USSFTA and AUSFTA included 86 interviews in Canberra, Geneva, Singapore and 
Washington, DC in 2004. CUSFTA included 28 interviews in Santiago and 
Washington, DC in 2006. KAFTA included 28 interviews in Canberra, Seoul and 
Sejong City in 2014–15. Confidentiality was assured all 142 respondents 
interviewed to secure data for these five cases. 
National governments usually field a negotiation team that includes between 25 
and 90 members in bilateral trade negotiations. Teams are normally organized into 
between 10 and 20 groups (normally one group per treaty chapter). Interviews with 
the team leader or chief negotiator, group leaders and any other officials who sat 
at the negotiation table were sought. Embassies play an important role in these 
negotiations, so interviews were sought with relevant diplomats, technical/policy 
specialists and ambassadors, although they do not normally sit at the negotiation 
table. The focus of this field research was on negotiations to draft and sign a trade 
treaty between two nations. Treaty approval through parliamentary or 
congressional process is a separate negotiation that is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
Interview notes and documents relevant to each negotiation were organized into 
cases to establish a comprehensive understanding of each negotiation.  
4 Case Material 
The following is a synopsis of five negotiations that achieved free trade 
agreements (FTAs). We devote two or three pages to each case, with special 
attention paid to negotiation closure. We begin by providing some background on 
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each case before focusing on negotiation closure. All five cases are examples of 
Type I – negotiations that reach agreement when not enough is still enough to 
make an agreement.   
Closure for SAFTA, USSFTA and AUSFTA are examples of driving behavioural 
patterns, CUSFTA offers an example of a mixed dueling and driving behavioural 
pattern, and KAFTA is primarily dueling up to the concluding stage and then it 
reverts to driving.  
Singapore–Australia Negotiation (SAFTA) 
Singapore and Australia announced their decision to commence negotiating a 
trade agreement on 15 November 2000 on the ‘sidelines’ of the APEC Leaders’ 
Summit in Brunei.  
Background 
Singapore’s negotiation delegation was led initially by Vanu Gopala Menon of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and many staff assigned to the Singaporean 
SAFTA team came from Directorate B, Trade Division of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MTI). The Australian delegation was led initially by Donald Kenyon of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and many staff assigned to the 
Australian SAFTA team came from the DFAT Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN).  
The two sides held ten negotiation rounds, with the first round in February 2001 
and the last round in October 2002 (normally a round will last for one week, with 
meeting sites alternating between Singapore and Australia). Halfway through the 
process (August 2001 to February 2002) the two sides called a hiatus, as the shift 
from a multilateral to a bilateral trade policy was controversial for many trade 
officials. On resuming negotiations, Stephen Deady of OTN led the Australian team 
and Goh Aik Guan of the Deputy Prime Minister’s office led the Singaporean team. 
Many trade issues were challenging for the 17 SAFTA working groups. Often we 
find two or three accepted formulae or templates for a specific trade policy issue. 
Agreement on the type of template to apply to a given issue minimizes such 
challenges. For example, in negotiations over goods and rules of origin (ROO), 
Singapore sought to persuade Australia to adopt a ‘change in tariff classification 
system’, but Australia refused and so SAFTA (Chapter 3) uses a ’value added 
system’ based on the net cost of a product.6 Within trade in services, the two most 
common templates are a ’positive list for trade in services’ or a ’negative list for 
trade in services’7 Australia insisted that the treaty adopt a negative list and 
                                                          
 6 Rules of origin (ROO) determine whether a good qualifies for preferential treatment (e.g. a 
reduced tariff), as it establishes a method for defining where a good was actually made. There 
are several ROO methods, but the most common are the value added or local content system, 
and the change in tariff classification or transformation system.  
 7 A negative list for trade in services allows for trade in any service unless it is specifically 
excluded in the trade treaty.  A positive list for trade in services allows for trade only if a 
service is specifically included in the trade treaty. A negative list is considered to be more 
liberal in encouraging international trade than a positive list.  
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Singapore argued for a positive list, but eventually relinquished, so SAFTA uses a 
negative list for managing trade in services (Chapter 7). Investment, financial 
services and telecommunications are treated separately within SAFTA (Chapters 8, 
9 and 10), but trade policy in the services chapter establishes a foundation for 
these other chapters. Reports indicate that negotiations in these chapters were 
more positional than integrative, as each side sought to protect its own interests. 
When working groups or their co-leaders could not resolve significant issues, the 
two Chief Negotiators eventually negotiated these issues. Many issues could be 
resolved but some had qualities that required political deliberations.  
Cooperation and Closure 
On the edge of an APEC Ministerial Meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico in October 
2002, Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile and Singaporean Trade Minister George 
Yeo discussed and resolved the remaining issues, including financial services, legal 
services, investment, and rules of origin. The 117-page SAFTA treaty (not including 
annexes and side letters) was signed by these Trade Ministers on 17 February 2003 
(see Table 2). The process leading up to closure suggests a driving behaviour 
pattern, while negotiations shifted from the technical to the political level at the 
end game. 
Table 2: Singapore–Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) outcome 
Preamble 
 1) Objectives and general definitions 
 2) Trade in goods 
 3) Rules of origin 
 4) Customs procedures 
 5) Technical regulations and sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures 
 6) Government procurement 
 7) Trade in services 
 8) Investment 
9) Financial services
10) Telecommunication services 
11) Movement of business persons 
12) Competition policy 
13) Intellectual property 
14) Electronic commerce 
15) Education cooperation 
16) Dispute settlement 
17) Final provisions 
 
United States–Singapore Negotiation (USSFTA) 
On 16 November 2000 on the sidelines of the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Brunei, 
Singapore and the United States announced that their nations would negotiate a 
trade agreement.  
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Background 
Professor Tommy Koh led Singapore’s delegation and many Singaporean 
negotiators were drawn from Directorate B, the Trade Division of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI). Ralph Ives led the US delegation and many US negotiators 
came from the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). There 
were 40 to 50 negotiators on each side during the negotiation. Each team 
organized its negotiators into 21 working groups, or one per treaty chapter. Eleven 
rounds were held, mostly in London, with the first held in December 2000 and the 
final round held in November 2002. The last substantive issue was resolved in 
January 2003.  
Among the many issues discussed and agreed, a number offered real challenges. 
From the beginning, the United States insisted that goods be divided into non-
textile and textile products. In goods, Singapore sought to eliminate tariffs early 
and the US sought to delay tariff elimination. In textiles, the United States forced 
Singapore to adopt the US Yarn Forward Rule (USSFTA Chapter 5).8  
The US arrived in Singapore with a 21-page initial position on intellectual 
property rights (IPR). Singaporean negotiators thought that the US position was 
very much focused on IPR enforcement where little capacity for enforcement 
exists, an approach that was not seen to be relevant to Singapore. Nevertheless, 
much of what the United States sought is found in USSFTA (Chapter 16).9  
In financial services, Singaporean liberalization was a top US priority (USSFTA 
Chapter 10). For example, the US successfully persuaded Singapore to liberalize its 
retail-banking sector and to phase out its wholesale bank license quota system for 
US banks. However, Singapore refused to allow US banks to acquire local 
Singaporean banks. In telecommunications (USSFTA Chapter 9), interviews indicate 
that Singapore and the United States created a state-of-the-art agreement 
between two open market economies. In electronic commerce (USSFTA Chapter 
14), both sides sought to explore every opportunity to liberalize trade and 
succeeded in establishing the first trade treaty ever concluded with electronic 
commerce provisions.  
 
                                                          
 8 The US Yarn Forwarding Rule allows a treaty partner to secure raw materials from anywhere 
in the world, but the yarn produced from this raw material must come from either treaty 
partner to gain US tariff benefits. Singapore argued that it was highly inefficient to transport 
yarn from the United States (Singapore does not have a yarn industry) just so Singaporean 
textile manufacturers can gain tariff benefits when exporting finished products to the United 
States. The two Chief Negotiators resolved this issue on the final day of the final round, with 
Singapore’s arguments unsuccessful in persuading the United States. 
 9 One high-level Singaporean official defended the US position on intellectual property rights 
(IPR) by stating that Singapore is small and can be bullied by a county like the United States. 
At the same time, the United States could back up all of its requests with specific examples. 
Nevertheless, Singaporeans directly involved in IPR negotiations questioned the relevance of 
the USSFTA IPR chapter to Singaporean conditions. 
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Cooperation and Closure 
USSFTA negotiations moved towards a conclusion when US Trade Representative 
Robert Zoellick and Singaporean Trade Minister George Yeo met at an APEC 
Ministerial Meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico in October 2002, followed by meetings 
between the United States and Singaporean Chief Negotiators. These meetings 
narrowed the list of outstanding issues from 30 to five issues – competition policy, 
financial services, investment, intellectual property and textiles. At the final round, in 
mid-November 2002, Yeo, Zoellick and ten negotiators from each side resolved all 
but one issue – investment and technology transfer (USSFTA Chapter 15) – which was 
resolved in mid-January 2003. Singaporean officials reported that Zoellick used 
anger and threats in concluding negotiations with Singapore although the 
asymmetrical nature of these negotiations is useful for understanding the final 
outcome that was achieved. However, the US had not conducted a significant trade 
agreement since NAFTA (most agree that the 2001 US – Jordan treaty is more of a 
political agreement than a trade agreement) and so the US arrived in Singapore with 
few templates (although they certainly had an intellectual property template). The 
US – Singapore negotiations and the US – Chile negotiations (to be reviewed shortly) 
provided the US with the templates that they later applied in so many other trade 
negotiations such as the US – Australia negotiations (to be reviewed next).  
US President Bush notified the US Congress of his intention to sign the USSFTA on 
30 January, and he and Singaporean Prime Minister Goh signed the 240-page treaty 
(800 pages when all annexes are included) on 6 May 2003 at the White House (please 
see Table 3). The process leading up to closure suggests a driving behaviour pattern, 
while negotiations shifted from the technical to the political level at the end game. 
Table 3: United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) outcome 
Preamble 
 1) Establishment of a free trade area 
and definitions 
 2) National treatment and market 
access for goods 
 3) Rules of origin 
 4) Customs administration 
 5) Textiles and apparel 
 6) Technical barriers to trade 
 7) Safeguards 
 8) Cross-border trade in services 
 9) Telecommunications 
10) Financial services 
11) Temporary entry of business 
persons 
12) Anti-competitive business conduct, 
designated monopolies, and 
government enterprises 
13) Government procurement 
14) Electronic commerce 
15) Investment 
16) Intellectual property rights 
17) Labor 
18) Environment 
19) Transparency 
20) Administration and dispute 
settlement 
General and final provisions 
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Australia–United States Negotiation (AUSFTA) 
The United States and Australia announced that they would commence 
negotiating a trade agreement on 14 November 2002.  
Background 
Ralph Ives led the US delegation and Stephen Deady led the Australian 
delegation. Many of the 60 to 70 staff assigned to the US team came from the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and many of the 60 to 70 
staff assigned to the Australian team came from the Office of Trade Negotiation 
(OTN) within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Each team 
organized its negotiators into 23 working groups, or one per treaty chapter. The 
two sides held six rounds between March 2003 and February 2004 – two in 
Canberra and two in Honolulu, with the final two in Washington, DC. Each round 
lasted one week, except the last round, which lasted three weeks. 
The two sides confronted a very brief time period for concluding negotiations. 
The fact that these negotiations could commence and finish in only 11 months can 
only be explained by the desire of each side to reach agreement and secure US 
Congressional treaty approval before the November 2004 US presidential election.  
Negotiations over goods did not present substantial challenges (AUSFTA Chapter 
2) – the focus was on tariff reduction – but some of the most contentious issues 
involved specific goods such as agriculture, textiles, and pharmaceuticals. 
Agriculture was the major AUSFTA issue for Australia. The US claimed that the 
Australian Import Risk Assessment system served as a non-tariff barrier to trade, 
while the two sides eventually agreed on an enhanced science-based risk-
assessment system (AUSFTA Chapter 7). In specific agricultural sectors Australia 
achieved no addition sugar exports to the US and its export quota for beef was 
increased by 70,000 tons. Australia secured small increases across many dairy 
product categories, resulting in some gains over a long phase-in period. 
Australian negotiators did not think that a national health program such as the 
Australian pharmaceutical benefits scheme (PBS) should be included in a trade 
agreement, but the US insisted, and so it was (as an annex to AUSFTA Chapter 2). 
The US was unsuccessful in seeking changes that would increase PBS medication 
prices, although Australia agreed to enhance PBS processes involving transparency. 
The US was very unsatisfied with this outcome. 
The most contentious services issue involved Australia’s right to ensure that local 
cultural content would be presented on Australia media, while both parties were 
generally pleased with the outcome they achieved (AUSFTA Chapter 10 including 
annexes). Within telecommunications (AUSFTA Chapter 12), financial services 
(AUSFTA Chapter 13) and electronic commerce (AUSFTA 16), the two sides adopted 
a cooperative framework that further integrates the two economies.  
Investment presented two challenges, as the United States sought to dismantle 
the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) – an agency that reviews all 
foreign investments in Australia over $50 million. Australia would not relinquish the 
FIRB, but it did increase the threshold to $800 million for US companies (AUSFTA 
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Chapter 11). The US was also unsuccessful in providing investors with the right to 
seek international arbitration in disputes with governments (Investor–State 
Dispute Settlement, or ISDS) (AUSFTA Chapter 11). In intellectual property 
(AUSFTA Chapter 17), Australia basically agreed to the same deal that the US gave 
Singapore. In fact, many templates and much text developed with Singapore in the 
USSFTA served as a point of departure in AUSFTA negotiations.  
Cooperation and Closure 
AUSFTA negotiations moved towards a conclusion after missing the initial 
December 2003 deadline. Negotiations were planned for two weeks but went into 
three weeks in January and February 2004 in Washington, DC. In the first week, 
each side sought to narrow the areas of disagreement with their full team. In the 
second and third weeks, these negotiations were passed up to political leaders on 
each side, including ministers, secretaries and ambassadors. AUSFTA team leaders 
also played an active role in this process, and working group leaders were brought 
in when technical expertise was required, although the focus of talks shifted to a 
search for political solutions. During the final two weeks, US and Australian political 
leaders found solutions for agriculture, cultural content in the media, FIRB, 
investor–state relations, intellectual property and the PBS. The Australian Prime 
Minister was regularly briefed and made compromise decisions on several issues. 
The US President was less involved in the process, as the US side was more focused 
on delivering a treaty that could gain US Congressional approval. Agreement was 
reached and negotiations concluded on 8 February 2004.   
Ann Capling (2005) is rather critical of the outcome achieved by Australia but 
such an outcome is to be expected in negotiations that are fundamentally 
asymmetrical in nature. Australia gave into the US on so many of their demands, 
while achieving so few of their own goals. Nevertheless, the US did not succeed to 
dismantle the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, did not create a purely 
free market for cultural content such as movies and television programing, and did 
not establish an investor – state dispute settlement system through AUSFTA. To 
say that Australia capitulated to all U.S. demands is inaccurate.  
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Table 4: Australia – United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) outcome 
Preamble 
 1) Establishment of a free trade area 
and definitions 
  2) National treatment and market 
access for goods  
   3) Agriculture 
   4) Textiles and apparel 
   5) Rules of origin 
   6) Customs administration 
   7) Sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures 
   8) Technical barriers to trade 
   9) Safeguards 
10) Cross-border trade in services 
11) Investment
12) Telecommunications 
13) Financial services 
14) Competition-related matters 
15) Government procurement 
16) Electronic commerce 
17) Intellectual property 
18) Labor 
19) Environment 
20) Transparency 
21) Institutional arrangements for 
dispute settlement 
22) General provisions and exceptions 
23) Final provisions 
 
US President Bush notified the US Congress of his intention to sign the AUSFTA 
on 13 February and USTR Robert Zoellick, representing the United States, and 
Trade Minister Mark Vaile, representing Australia, signed the 264-page treaty (over 
1,000 pages when annexes and side letters are included) on 18 May 2004 at the 
White House (please see Table 4). The process leading up to closure suggests a 
driving behaviour pattern, while negotiations shifted from the technical to the 
political level at the end game. 
Chile–United States Negotiation (CUSFTA) 
Chile and the United States began trade negotiations in 1994 (as part of the Four-
Amigo Talks), as Chilean leaders linked their trade aspirations to the recently 
concluded North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Complications between 
US President Clinton and the US Congress did not allow negotiations to proceed, 
but talks had begun. When the US and Singapore announced their intention to 
negotiate an FTA, Chilean leaders immediately reminded the US that they had been 
waiting for five years. Shortly thereafter, the US was concurrently negotiating two 
separate bilateral FTA with Chile and Singapore, beginning in November 2000. 
Background 
Ambassador Osvaldo Rosales led Chile’s delegation with 90–100 staff assigned to 
the Chile CUSFTA team that were drawn from the General Directorate for 
International Economic Relations within the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. 
Regina Vargo led the US delegation with 40 – 50 staff assigned to the US CUSFTA 
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team that came from the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 
Each team organized its negotiators into 24 working groups, or one per treaty 
chapter.  
There was a rush to accomplish an outcome prior to US President Clinton’s 
January 2001 departure from office, followed by an extended pause as the US 
Executive Office underwent a change in administration with CUSFTA negotiations 
recommencing in mid-2001. Talks continued, and 10 rounds were conducted in 
Washington, DC and Santiago, Chile before negotiations were suspended in March 
2002 because the USTR lacked sufficient guidance from the US Congress. The US 
Trade Promotion Authority Act (Public Law 107–210, also known as the fast-track 
authority) was passed by Congress and enacted into law on 6 August 2002. This 
provided the guidance the USTR required. CUSFTA talks resumed in September 
2002.  
Cooperation and Closure 
Agreement was reached at the 14th negotiation round, with some of the most 
difficult issues concerning US financial objectives. For example, the US was 
concerned about movement of capital – especially the movement of capital out of 
Chile. The US also sought to establish a policy that would allow foreign banks to set 
up in Chile without committing capital – a proposal Chile successfully rejected (see 
CUSFTA Chapter 12). 
Other issues that were finalized in the last round included the phase-out of the 
85 per cent Chilean tax on the custom value of cars above the threshold of 
US$15,740 and the elimination of copper tariffs on the US side – Chile’s largest 
export product (see CUSFTA Chapter 3). These final issues were not traded straight 
across; rather, they were part of a larger bundle or package of issues that also 
included advantages for Chilean small and medium-sized companies in the US 
market, among other issues. 
Given the financial nature of these final unresolved issues, negotiations were 
concluded by the Chilean Minister of Finance and the Chilean Chief Negotiator on 
one side and USTR leadership and the US Chief Negotiator on the other side. 
Agreement was reached in principle in December 2002.  
The asymmetrical nature of these negotiations is useful for understanding the 
final outcome that was achieved, although the US had not conducted a significant 
trade agreement since NAFTA (most agree that the 2001 US – Jordan treaty is 
more of a political agreement than a trade agreement) and so the US arrived in 
Chile with few templates. The US – Chile negotiations and the US – Singapore 
negotiations (previously reviewed) provided the US with the fundamental 
templates that they later applied to so many other trade negotiations starting with 
the US – Australia negotiations, which followed directly after US negotiations with 
Chile and Singapore.  
The bilateral process became complicated the following month, shortly after 
Chile became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Negotiations 
were practically concluded, and now each side deployed a team of lawyers to 
engage in “legal-scrubbing” to convert the agreement into a treaty. Concurrently, 
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the US began to delay this process to pressure Chile to vote in the UN Security 
Council in support of a US proposal to initiate war against Iraq. Chile did not 
cooperate on this US initiative, but still had to manage US attempts to link 
international trade and international security. 
Conclusion of the treaty was delayed, but USTR Robert B. Zoellick and Chilean 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria Soledad Alvear Valenzuela finally signed it on the 
sidelines of a Free Trade Area of the Americas Ministerial meeting in June 2003 
(please see Table 5). The process leading up to closure demonstrates a mixed 
pattern of behaviour that is both driving and dueling. 
Table 5: United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) outcome 
Preamble 
 1) Initial provisions 
 2) General definitions  
 3) National treatment & market 
access 
 4) Rules of origin 
 5) Customs administration 
 6) Sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures 
 7) Technical barriers to trade 
 8) Trade remedies 
 9) Government procurement 
10) Investment 
11) Cross-border trade in services 
12) Financial services
13) Telecommunications 
14) Temporary entry for business persons
15) Electronic commerce 
16) Competition policy 
17) Intellectual property rights 
18) Labor 
19) Environment 
20) Transparency 
21) Administration of the agreement 
22) Dispute settlement 
23) Exceptions 
24) Final provisions 
Korea–Australia Negotiation (KAFTA) 
Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that 
FTA negotiations would begin between Korea and Australia in March 2009. 
Background 
Korean Minister for Trade Kim Jeong-hoon met with Australian Minister for Trade 
Simon Crean in Canberra to officially launch the first round of the Korea–Australia 
Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) negotiations in May 2009. Four rounds followed, in 
Seoul and Canberra, led by Australia Jan Adams of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and Korean Lee Tae-ho of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MOFAT). Generally there were between 50 and 90 trade negotiators on 
each side during the five KAFTA rounds that occurred between May 2009 and May 
2010. 
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Much was accomplished in 2009–10 and this can be explained in part because 
both Korea and Australia had previously negotiated with the US and so that 
experience had harmonized each nation’s trade policy. However, negotiations 
stalled and then deadlocked for over three years starting in 2010, which can be 
explained by several factors although it was actually a single substantive issue that 
halted negotiations: Korea could not accept an FTA that did not include Investor–
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), while the Australian Labor Party – which then 
controlled the Australian government – could not accept an FTA that included 
ISDS.10 
ISDS was the “Big Issue” in this negotiation and is controversial in Australia and 
the issue was also controversial in Korea, as Korea’s insistence on including ISDS in 
KAFTA was based on the US requirement that ISDS be included in the Korea–US 
trade treaty. Upon accepting this US demand, the Korean government explained to 
the public that ISDS was a new standard that was widely accepted internationally. 
To not pursue ISDS in every future Korean treaty would cause complications 
between the Korean government and their opposition parties, which could have 
impacted negatively on Korea–US relations. Korea refused to back down in KAFTA 
because of these domestic complications. 
Cooperation and Closure 
The September 2013 change of government in Australia broke this deadlock, as 
the new government wanted to demonstrate to Australia, Asia and the world that 
it was ready to do business, so ISDS was given away by Australia in exchange for a 
number of Australian offensive interests, including 40 per cent Korean beef tariffs 
that will reduce to zero over 15 years, and reductions in dairy, grain, sugar and wine 
tariffs. On full implementation, 99.8 per cent of Australian products will enter 
Korea duty free. Australia also gained access to the Korea services market on terms 
that are equal to those Korea gave the US and the European Union in Korea’s prior 
FTAs. 
Korea also achieved gains that included duty-free imports of almost all products 
into Australia within five years, including the immediate elimination of tariffs on 
Korean automobiles, televisions and refrigerators. Further, Korea achieved some 
protective measures for its agricultural sector within KAFTA, and Korean investors 
receive the same treatment granted to US investors in the Australian market.  
A team of high-level negotiators led by the Australian and Korean Trade Ministers 
put this final package together in November and December 2013. The new 
Australian Trade Minister Andrew Robb visited Korea and met with Deputy Prime 
Minister Hyun Oh-seok and Minister for Trade, Industry and Energy Yoon Sang-jick 
in November 2013; at this meeting, progress was made on several politically 
                                                          
 10 Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a set of policies that assure a corporation’s right 
to take a national government to third-party arbitration if that government engages in 
behaviour (passes a law, changes enforcement of a regulation, etc.) that results in apparent 
corporate financial loss.  
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sensitive issues. Minister Robb and Minister Yoon concluded negotiations on the 
sideline of a WTO Ministerial in Bali, Indonesia in December 2013. Australian Trade 
Minister Robb and Korean Trade Minister Yoon signed the KAFTA in Seoul in April 
2014 (please see Table 6). KAFTA primarily demonstrated a dueling behavioural 
pattern up to the concluding stage and then it reverted to a driving behavioural 
pattern, while negotiations shifted from the technical to the political level at the 
end game. 
Table 6: Korea – Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) outcome 
Preamble 
 1) Initial provisions and definitions  
 2) Trade in goods 
 3) Rules of origin 
 4) Customs administration and trade 
facilitation 
 5) Technical barriers to trade and 
sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures 
 6) Trade remedies 
 7) Trade in services 
 8) Financial services 
 9) Telecommunications 
10) Movement of natural persons 
11) Investment
12) Government procurement 
13) Intellectual property rights 
14) Competition policy 
15) Electronic commerce 
16) Cooperation 
17) Labor 
18) Environment 
19) Transparency 
20) Dispute resolution  
21) Institutional provisions 
22) General provisions and exceptions 
23) Final provisions 
5 Case Analysis: Cooperation and Closure in Complex 
Bilateral Negotiations 
These five cases provide a rich database that allows us to investigate the forces 
and processes that contribute to closure in complex bilateral trade negotiations. 
We will consider negotiation closure in the context of negotiation party stability 
and instability, creditable deadlines and linkage dynamics, exchange of politically 
sensitive issues, and negotiating bilateral agreements on the sideline of a 
multilateral forum. This analysis will provide the foundation for the development 
of a process model that supports understanding of closure in complex bilateral 
negotiations.  
Party Stability – Instability  
The stability or instability of a group (a political party in the present study) that 
actually controls a negotiating party (a national government in the present study) 
Crump  |  Cooperation and Closure in Bilateral Trade Negotiations 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 17 24 
 
 
appears to have a dramatic impact on negotiation-closure dynamics. KAFTA and 
AUSFTA each support this observation. For example, most of KAFTA was 
negotiated within the first year, during 2009–10, and then a stalemate turned into 
a three-year deadlock primarily over the ’Big Issue’ Investor–State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS). It seemed that there was no room to compromise on this issue, 
as Korea wanted ISDS included and Australia did not. After Korea elected a new 
president (although the Korean Saenuri Party remained in control of the Executive 
Branch) in February 2013, the Australian Trade Minister visited Korea to see 
whether Korea’s ISDS position had changed, and learned to his dismay that the 
Korean position was still firmly in place.  
KAFTA closure only became possible after the Australian Liberal/National 
coalition replaced the Australian Labor Party in a national election in September 
2013. A new Australian Trade Minister visited Korea shortly thereafter, and 
explained that in the future ISDS would be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Essentially the political group that controlled Australia was replaced, which 
brought about flexibility on a single issue that had deadlocked negotiations. KAFTA 
was concluded three months later. Australian party instability created the 
conditions that supported closure.  
ISDS was that stumbling block that created a deadlock. William Zartman (2015) 
notes that when a single issue creates dueling behaviour that issue will tend to 
take its importance from its representation of the entire relationship. This certainly 
seems likely but in this case we find that it was more complicated. The Korea 
government would have had to manage domestic conflict because after they 
included ISDS in their trade treaty with the U.S. they had explained to the public 
that ISDS was the new global standard. To then omit ISDS from KAFTA would have 
raised questions about the government’s honesty with the Korean public. The 
Korean government seemed prepared to ‘wait-out’ Australia forever.  
A second example also demonstrates the dramatic impact that party stability or 
instability can have on negotiation closure dynamics. At the start of AUSFTA 
negotiations, US President George W. Bush was concerned that AUSFTA treaty 
ratification through the US Congress would negatively impact upon Republican 
Party control of the US government, as US presidential election were scheduled for 
November 2004. The US agricultural lobby was especially concerned about 
commencing AUSFTA negotiations. To counter this possibility, the two sides 
established December 2003 as the AUSFTA deadline – essentially compressing a 
two- to three-year negotiation into less than a year – this case was absolutely 
driven based on a game of deadlines.  Although the initial deadline was not 
achieved, negotiations continued non-stop for two weeks in January 2004 with 
agreement achieved in early February, thus concluding AUSFTA in 11 months of 
negotiations. Concern that AUSFTA could jeopardize Republican Party control over 
the Executive Branch drove a negotiation process that dramatically influenced 
negotiation closure.  
A desire to maintain party stability, party instability, and/or the perception or 
potential for instability appears to influence negotiation closure dynamics by 
rapidly driving the process toward closure (AUSFTA), by delaying a process that 
might lead to closure (KAFTA), and by breaking a deadlock (KAFTA) that 
contributes to conditions that result in negotiation closure. The relationship 
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between party stability and closure, and party instability and closure deserves 
further study. 
Creditable Deadlines and Linkage Dynamics 
AUSFTA is the only case of five that established a creditable deadline although it 
is noted that a deadline was essential in creating closure in the GATT Uruguay 
through linkage to expiration of US Fast Track Authority (see Review of Literature). 
It may be that linkage dynamics is one fundamental force supporting a creditable 
deadline or a game of deadlines.  
Seeking to avoid AUSFTA Congressional approval during a US presidential re-
election period resulted in a complex negotiation being compressed into 11 
months and created a deadline that forced parties to give up specific offensive 
interests. The US wanted, but did not secure, an ISDS clause, nor was it successful in 
dismantling the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board (FIBR); nor was the US 
successful in dismantling the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme. The 
Australians, on the other hand, had hoped to achieve greater market access for 
their agricultural goods in the US market. A driving pattern of behaviour came to an 
abrupt end although each side wanted much more but the risk of delaying closure 
were perceived to be too great. A delay was unacceptable to the US Executive 
branch and the Republican Party, as they each feared that AUSFTA could become 
too costly an issue in the upcoming US Presidential election. Here we observe how 
a creditable deadline was created through consecutive-future linkage dynamics 
(Crump 2007). 
Deadlines are often created through linkage dynamics, but linkages serve as the 
foundation for many strategic acts. For example, the US linked CUSFTA closure to 
decisions occurring within the UN Security Council. In this case, the US indicated 
that it was prepared to delay FTA closure and perhaps even postpone FTA closure if 
Chile were unwilling to support the US military agenda within the UN Security 
Council. This strategy represents a form of brinkmanship in which each side had to 
carefully calculate its own and the other side’s real interests and constraints. This 
last-minute development added another dimension and substantial complexity to a 
negotiation that was already rather complex. In the end, the US government 
realized that the United States required a stable partner in Latin America more 
than it needed to punish a “recalcitrant” partner. Traditional issue-linkage, as 
defined within the field of international relations, briefly delayed and almost 
derailed the CUSFTA closure. 
Exchange of Politically Sensitive Issues 
SAFTA and USSFTA were concluded through an exchange of politically sensitive 
issues at the ministerial level, indicating that trade diplomats negotiate trade 
issues and political leaders negotiate politically sensitive issues. Essentially, there 
were two negotiating teams operating at two hierarchical levels that were engaged 
in concurrently linked negotiations (Crump 2010). Negotiations are begun at senior 
levels and then passed down to a team of diplomats to work out most of the 
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technical details before being taken back over by senior officials who bring an FTA 
negotiation to a conclusion. We see this two-level hierarchical dynamic occurring in 
all five cases although AUSFTA, KAFTA and CUSFTA included additional dynamics 
during closure (see previous discussion above).  
We observe this two-level hierarchical structure within the senior-political level 
becoming engaged at the initiation and commencement stage and trade diplomats 
engaged in between although this team of diplomates is always led by a senior 
diplomat that has strong links to the political level.  Within this pattern, we find 
that political decisions are made with a focus on each side achieving a ‘defensible 
settlement’ – a game of echoes. Fundamental is the construction and 
communication of settlement packages, which may include trades on individual 
issues or trades involving packages of issues. This system of making trades through 
a process of give-and-take is fundamental to negotiation and well understood 
within the literature.  
Another way of thinking about the emergence of a defensible settlement 
package or game of echoes is to understand that senior-political leaders are 
looking for a “landing pad” that is large enough for a politically safe landing.  Where 
a negotiation actually settles on the landing pad is unclear initially but it is clear 
that the pad is sufficiently large to hold all the critical elements required for a 
political settlement and closure.  
At the end game this dynamic can be seen to be a game of echoes but it also 
demonstrates a desire to manage principal–agent relations so that the principal has 
greater control over the event being managed by a senior agent.  
Negotiating on the Sidelines 
It is interesting to note the role of APEC in providing a venue for bilateral 
negotiations, while recognizing that many bilateral negotiations are initiated and 
concluded at senior levels (presidential, ministerial, etc.) in multilateral meetings. 
Investigating the fundamental nature of these “sideline” negotiations may offer 
some understanding of how negotiation closure is achieved.  
In our study, several bilateral negotiations occurred on the sidelines of regular 
APEC meetings. For example, the APEC Leaders Summit in Brunei in 2000 allowed 
for informal bilateral meetings, which resulted in separate announcements about 
the commencement of both SAFTA and USSFTA. In the later case, the USSFTA 
announcement caused Chile to remind the United States that Chile had been 
seeking a FTA with the US since the conclusion of NAFTA (through the Four Amigo 
talks).  
Negotiations to advance FTAs also occur on the sidelines of Ministerial APEC 
meetings. US and Singaporean Trade Ministers were able to narrow the range of 
outstanding issues at a ministerial meeting held in Mexico in 2002. This 
achievement shifted USSFTA negotiations into the concluding stage, while SAFTA 
negotiations between Australia and Singapore actually concluded at this same 
Ministerial meeting. 
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6 Conclusion: Cooperation and Closure 
In this study, we examined cooperation and closure in five bilateral free trade 
negotiations that only include APEC members as negotiating parties: Australia, 
Chile, Korea, Singapore and the United States. Where and when does negotiation 
closure occur? As a regional association, APEC regularly serves as a venue and 
meeting place for Presidents, Prime Ministers, Secretaries and Ministers. Often, 
negotiations are initiated and concluded, and cooperation achieved when senior 
leaders meet.  
Specifically, closure is possible when two or more parties negotiate to a point 
where a defensible settlement or game of echoes for all parties is evident. This 
potential defensible outcome establishes a negotiation ’landing-pad’ – a landing 
pad that simply requires a venue for closure. Regional and global summits and 
ministerials often serve as a venue for bilateral negotiations that occur on the 
’sidelines’. 
SAFTA negotiators, for example, built a landing-pad prior to the Los Cabos 
Mexico APEC Ministerial in October 2002, so Australian and Singaporean Trade 
Ministers were able to bring closure to SAFTA on the sidelines of that APEC 
Ministerial. US and Singaporean Trade Ministers met at that same venue and were 
able to reduce the number of outstanding issues from 30 to five issues. Perhaps a 
USSFTA landing-pad was built at the Los Cabos APEC Ministerial, as USSFTA 
negotiations concluded two months later in Singapore. 
After a very complicated endgame, the United States and Chile concluded 
CUSFTA negotiations on the sidelines of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
Ministerial in Miami in June 2003. Australia and Korea concluded KAFTA 
negotiations on the sidelines of the WTO Ministerial in Bali in December 2013. In 
each case, sub-process negotiations had progressed to the point where a landing-
pad was established and then the final piece of the puzzle was a venue that 
brought relevant senior political leaders (i.e. Trade Ministers) together to finalize 
the deal. This shift from technical agents to political agents provides greater 
control to the principal in concluding negotiations.  
It might be useful to study the planning that occurs to create these ’sideline’ 
bilateral negotiations. Advisers to ministers, secretaries, presidents and prime 
ministers must have protocol or some guiding principles for establishing sideline 
meetings. Who approaches who first, how is the agenda established, who is 
included and excluded, who is available (in person or via video conference), what is 
the role of Chief Negotiators and what is the role of Committee Chairs (for issues in 
dispute) in sideline meetings? Pulling away from a multilateral gathering to 
conduct a bilateral negotiation may be more than a scheduling exercise. Do 
strategic opportunities or constraints exist within side meetings that are held at a 
multilateral or regional venue, compared with holding a bilateral meeting 
independent of a regional or international setting? Do strategic opportunities exist 
that might provide one side or the other with an advantage? We do not know, and 
such questions may well be worthy of study. 
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Negotiation linkages are especially effective in creating closure in negotiations as 
such dynamics can establish creditable deadlines although linkages have also been 
found to delay negotiation closure. A creditable deadline may be the most efficient 
means for bringing about closure in a complex setting, but what constitutes a 
creditable deadline? There exists some kind of inherent logic that seems to link the 
negotiation to some external event or process. When a creditable deadline can be 
established – usually though some external event or process – it can create a game 
of deadlines.  
Linkages can also delay closure, as was observed in the CAFTA case. In this 
example, the goals of the more powerful party expanded beyond the agreed-upon 
trade agenda to include questions of security within the UN Security Council via 
issue linkage. Significant research has been conducted on issue linkage, although 
much of this work is grounded in an international relations tradition (Crump 2007, 
2013). There could be utility in studying issue linkage as a tactic within a 
negotiation tradition. Issue linkages and deadline linkages were observed in the 
present study, while it is possible that other linkage forms could contribute to 
negotiation closure. 
Deadline linkages are also associated with party stability. Party stability means 
that those groups that control a negotiating party are able to maintain control over 
that party. For example, in AUSFTA we find an entity (the US Republican Party) that 
was so concerned with losing control of the US Executive Branch (the branch that 
controls trade negotiations) that it compressed an FTA negotiation that typically 
takes two to three years into just 11 months. In this case, the Republican Party 
feared that its agreement with Australia would damage its re-election goals, so it 
sought to distance these negotiations from the election by concluding the 
negotiations well before the traditional US campaign period. This external event 
created a game of deadlines. 
Party instability means that those groups that control a negotiation party lose 
control over that party. Party instability can be observed in KAFTA negotiations, 
where a negotiation deadlock was finally resolved because the Australian Labor 
Party was removed from office, thus allowing the Liberal/National Coalition Party 
to take control of the Australian government (the negotiating party) and 
implement more flexible objectives. Again, party stability – instability served as a 
factor in creating closure. Gaining further understanding about the relationship 
between group control or loss of control over a negotiating party would enhance 
our knowledge of closure dynamics.  
Many research opportunities exist that can help us to understand how complex 
negotiations achieve closure. Initially, it is useful to recognize that negotiation 
closure exists as a sub-process within our understanding of negotiation process. 
The present study has offered a preliminary model that is based on to few cases 
that may be unique to a particular context. Developing a valid context-free process 
model of closure in complex negotiation will require a larger and more diverse data 
set. 
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